本研究以國內上市、上櫃與興櫃公司為研究對象，探討企業屬於董事長與總經理非為同一人兼任之情形下，董事長與總經理之權力差距對於公司長期性投資決策以及整體經營效率所產生的影響，並以董事長與總經理年資作為衡量兩者權力差距之代理變數，樣本期間為2006年至2013年。本實證研究發現，在公司存在著「論資排輩」的職場淺規則，使得董事長權力大過於總經理權力的合理假設之下，公司之經營方針將會以董事長個人利益為依歸。董事長權力愈大，其投入於長期性之研究發展與資本支出的意願將會愈高，且公司現金股利發放比率愈低，最終導致公司經營效率不佳，產生管理階層與外部股東之間的代理問題。研究發展費用項目屬於裁量性支出，且具備高風險特性，容易造成內部人與外部股東之間存在著資訊不對稱，經營效率不佳便是反映出董事長會為了滿足私人利益而產生過度投資行為，現金股利支付率低亦隱含著公司內部人所擁有的自由現金流量增加，產生潛在資金濫用的問題。本研究進一步的結果發現，當董事長對於公司實際經營權力凌駕於專業經理人時，投資大眾將會對於董事長之決策動機產生疑慮，進而導致公司股票價格波動程度增加，並且提高要求報酬率，使公司所面臨之權益資金成本增加。;This study examine the relationship between the power of chairman and the corporate long-term investment decisions. Theoretically, when firms’ managerial structure are separate titles, chairmen only hold an iconic role in an enterprise and seldom get involved in firm’s daily operations, and CEOs(or general managers) are the dominantly governing role to take charge of the entire run and business. In other words, CEOs enjoy the major decisions power. In Taiwan, however, there is a common phenomenon that a firm’s chairman seems to own the actual managerial power. I employ chairman tenure and CEO tenure as the proxy for power. The empirical evidence show that chairman power has a positive impact on R&D investment and capital expenditure, suggesting that powerful chairman would make the long-term investment decisions consist with the interest of the shareholders. However, further results show that the powerful chairman would result in agency costs and induce higher cost of equity. The findings suggest that the more powerful the chairman is, the more operating inefficiency would be.
